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Bibliografia
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Keywords
FINANCIAL MARKETS, BUSINESS CYCLE, GROWTH, INFORMATION, MONETARY POLICY, INVESTMENT

The importance of financial market imperfections for stability, growth and economic policy.

Abstract
The dimension and the integration of financial markets has increased very rapidly in the last twenty years. These developments have been beneficial with respect to social welfare, but, in some cases, they have also increased economic instability and risks of contagion, and they have presented new problems for regulatory agencies and policy makers. The problem arises from the fact that financial markets are not working under ideal conditions (i.e., the conditions that are usually assumed in Arrow-Debreu-type of economies). Namely, there is typically asymmetric information, market incompleteness, moral hazard and many other incentive problems. The aim of this research project is to analyze the relation between financial market imperfections and macroeconomic equilibria both in terms of efficiency and stability. In particular, we will re-examine the role of fiscal and monetary policies in models where financial phenomena are taken into account. A first part of the project will be mainly concentrated on the analysis of economic growth, (physical and human) capital accumulation and risk sharing in multi-agents (or multi-country) models. A second part will focus on the effects of competition between financial intermediaries on efficiency and stability (assuming that contractual relations may not be exclusive). A third part will be concentrated on the characterization of optimal monetary policies and instruments in some class of models where financial imperfections are explicitly >>>

Principal Investigator
Pietro Reichlin Libera Univ. Inter.le Studi Sociali "Guido Carli" LUISS-ROMA
Research Objectives
Most of the macroeconomic literature concentrates on the analysis of models with a representative agent in economies characterized by technological shocks. Besed on these models, one can safely state that there are limited advantages deriving from stabilization policies when the business cycle is caused by recurrent exogenous aggregate shocks. If, in turn, stabilization can only be achieved at the price of distortions (deriving from taxes), it is very likely that stabilization policies can have a negative net impact on social welfare (cf. Lucas (2003)). Recently, this statement has been re-examined using models with heterogeneous agents and individual non insurable risks. One can conjecture that, even if the social benefits from stabilization of the cycle is low on average, these benefits could be extremely high for agents with low income, have less insurance opportunities and limited access to the credit market. An attempt to quantify the benefits from stabilization policies in such models is under way and preliminary results seem to offer ambiguous predictions. It is clear that, when evaluating policies in these models, one needs to consider not only the consequences of a reallocation of consumption over time, but also the consequences of reallocations between different individuals and sectors of the economy. However, these models are subject to some very important criticisms. Namely, market incompleteness is an ad hoc assumption and one may claim that, by allowing for a >>>

Timescale
24 months
National and international background
One of the main topics that will be considered within this project (which will be mostly developed by the Bologna research unit) is related to the consequences of limited insurance and diversification of idiosyncratic risks on human capital investment. In dealing with financial markets imperfections, investments in human capital are particularly interesting, because they are affected by all the different sorts of imperfections usually imputed to financial markets: liquidity constraints (see, for instance, Andolfatto and Gervais (2006), Cameron and Taber (2000a and 200b), Carneiro and Heckman (2002), de la Croix and Michel (2004), Fender and Wang (2000) and Hanushek, Leung and Yilmaz (2004)), hidden information and screening (see, for instance, Cremer and Pestieu (2004) and Jacobs and van Wijbergen (2005a, 2005b)), hidden action (see, for instance, Bovenberg and e Jacobs (2003) and De Fraja (2002)). Two additional problems are the impossibility of diversification (see, for instance, Christiansen, Joensen and Nielsen (2004)) and irreversibility (see, for instance, Dixit and Pyndick (1994) and Jacobs (2005)). The literature on investments in human capital has been growing exponentially in the last few years. The increasing policy relevance of this topic has been an important stimulus to research (for instance, think of the E.U.’s Lisbon Agenda). Looking at the recent European experience, empirical analyses show that, in all the main countries, there are very substantive public >>>